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Abstract
We introduce Casper, a proof of stake-based finality system which overlays an existing proof of
work blockchain. Casper is a partial consensus mechanism combining proof of stake algorithm
research and Byzantine fault tolerant consensus theory. We introduce our system, prove some
desirable features, and show defenses against long range revisions and catastrophic crashes.
The Casper overlay provides almost any proof of work chain with additional protections against
block reversions.
1. Introduction
Over the past few years there has been considerable research into “proof of stake” (PoS) based blockchain
consensus algorithms. In a PoS system, a blockchain appends and agrees on new blocks through a process where
anyone who holds coins inside of the system can participate, and the influence an agent has is proportional to the
number of coins (or “stake”) it holds. This is a vastly more efficient alternative to proof of work (PoW) “mining”
and enables blockchains to operate without mining’s high hardware and electricity costs.
There are two major schools of thought in PoS design. The first, chain-based proof of stake[1, 2], mimics proof of
work mechanics and features a chain of blocks and simulates mining by pseudorandomly assigning the right to
create new blocks to stakeholders. This includes Peercoin[3], Blackcoin[4], and Iddo Bentov’s work[5].
The other school, Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) based proof of stake, is based on a thirty-year-old body of
research into BFT consensus algorithms such as PBFT[6]. BFT algorithms typically have proven mathematical
properties; for example, one can usually mathematically prove that as long as > 23 of protocol participants are
following the protocol honestly, then, regardless of network latency, the algorithm cannot finalize conflicting
blocks. Repurposing BFT algorithms for proof of stake was first introduced by Tendermint[7], and has modern
inspirations such as [8]. Casper follows this BFT tradition, though with some modifications.
1.1. Our Work
Casper the Friendly Finality Gadget is an overlay atop a proposal mechanism—a mechanism which proposes
blocks1. Casper is responsible for finalizing these blocks, essentially selecting a unique chain which represents
the canonical transactions of the ledger. Casper provides safety, but liveness depends on the chosen proposal
mechanism. That is, if attackers wholly control the proposal mechanism, Casper protects against finalizing two
conflicting checkpoints, but the attackers could prevent Casper from finalizing any future checkpoints.
Casper introduces several new features that BFT algorithms do not necessarily support:
• Accountability. If a validator violates a rule, we can detect the violation and know which validator
violated the rule. Accountability allows us to penalize malfeasant validators, solving the “nothing at
stake” problem that plagues chain-based PoS. The penalty for violating a rule is a validator’s entire
deposit. This maximal penalty is the defense against violating the protocol. Because proof of stake
security is based on the size of the penalty, which can be set to greatly exceed the gains from the mining
reward, proof of stake provides strictly stronger security incentives than proof of work.
1This functionality serves a similar role to the common abstraction of “leader election” used in traditional BFT algorithms,
but is adapted to accomodate Casper’s construction of being a finality overlay atop an existing blockchain.
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• Dynamic validators. We introduce a safe way for the validator set to change over time (Section 3).
• Defenses. We introduce defenses against long range revision attacks as well as attacks where more than
1
3 of validators drop offline, at the cost of a very weak tradeoff synchronicity assumption (Section 4).
• Modular overlay. Casper’s design as an overlay makes it easier to implement as an upgrade to an
existing proof of work chain.
We describe Casper in stages, starting with a simple version (Section 2) and then progressively adding validator
set changes (Section 3) and finally defenses against attacks (Section 4).
2. The Casper Protocol
Within Ethereum, the proposal mechanism will initially be the existing proof of work chain, making the first
version of Casper a hybrid PoW/PoS system. In future versions the PoW proposal mechanism will be replaced
with something more efficient. For example, we can imagine converting the block proposal into a some kind of
PoS round-robin block signing scheme.
In this simple version of Casper, we assume there is a fixed set of validators and a proposal mechanism (e.g.,
the familiar proof of work proposal mechanism) which produces child blocks of existing blocks, forming an
ever-growing block tree. From [9] the root of the tree is typically called the “genesis block”.
Under normal circumstances, we expect that the proposal mechanism will typically propose blocks one after the
other in a linked list (i.e., each “parent” block having exactly one “child” block). But in the case of network
latency or deliberate attacks, the proposal mechanism will inevitably occassionally produce multiple children of
the same parent. Casper’s job is to choose a single child from each parent, thus choosing one canonical chain from
the block tree.
Rather than deal with the full block tree, for efficiency purposes2 Casper only considers the subtree of checkpoints
forming the checkpoint tree (Figure 1a). The genesis block is a checkpoint, and every block whose height in the
block tree (or block number) is an exact multiple of 100 is also a checkpoint. The “checkpoint height” of a block
with block height 100 ∗ k is simply k; equivalently, the height h(c) of a checkpoint c is the number of elements in
the checkpoint chain stretching from c (non-inclusive) to the root along the parent links (Figure 1b).3
Each validator has a deposit; when a validator joins, its deposit is the number of deposited coins. After joining,
each validator’s deposit rises and falls with rewards and penalties. Proof of stake’s security derives from the size
of the deposits, not the number of validators, so for the rest of this paper, when we say “ 23 of validators”, we are
referring to the deposit-weighted fraction; that is, a set of validators whose sum deposit size equals to 23 of the
total deposit size of the entire set of validators.
Validators can broadcast a vote message containing four pieces of information (Table 1): two checkpoints s and t
together with their heights h(s) and h(t). We require that s be an ancestor of t in the checkpoint tree, otherwise
the vote is considered invalid. If the public key of the validator ν is not in the validator set, the vote is considered
invalid. Together with the signature of the validator, we will write these votes in the form 〈ν, s, t, h(s),h(t)〉.
Notation Description
s the hash of any justified checkpoint (the “source”)
t any checkpoint hash that is a descendent of s (the “target”)
h(s) the height of checkpoint s in the checkpoint tree
h(t) the height of checkpoint t in the checkpoint tree
S signature of 〈s, t,h(s),h(t)〉 from the validator ν’s private key
Table 1: The schematic of a single VOTE message denoted 〈ν, s, t, h(s),h(t)〉.
We define the following terms:
2A long distance between checkpoints reduces the overhead of the algorithm, but also increases the time it takes to come to
consensus. We choose a spacing of 99 blocks between checkpoints as a middle ground.
3Specifically, the height of a checkpoint is not the same as the number of ancestors in the checkpoint tree all the way back
to root along the supermajority links (defined in the next section).
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(a) The checkpoint tree. The dashed line represents 99 blocks between the checkpoints, which are represented by
rounded rectangles. The root of the tree is denoted “r”.
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h(b1) = 1
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(b) The height function
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(c) The justified chain r → b1 → b2 → b3
Figure 1: Illustrating a checkpoint tree, the height function, and a justified chain within the checkpoint tree.
• A supermajority link is an ordered pair of checkpoints (a, b), also written a→ b, such that at least 23 of
validators (by deposit) have published votes with source a and target b. Supermajority links can skip
checkpoints, i.e., it’s perfectly okay for h(b) > h(a) + 1. Figure 1c shows three distinct supermajority
links in red: r → b1, b1 → b2, and b2 → b3.
• Two checkpoints a and b are called conflicting if and only if they are nodes in distinct branches, i.e.,
neither is an ancestor or descendant of the other.
• A checkpoint c is called justified if (1) it is the root, or (2) there exists a supermajority link c′ → c where
checkpoint c′ is justified. Figure 1c shows a chain of four justified blocks.
• A checkpoint c is called finalized if (1) it is the root or (2) it is justified and there is a supermajority link
c→ c′ where c′ is a direct child of c. Equivalently, checkpoint c is finalized if and only if: checkpoint
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AN INDIVIDUAL VALIDATOR ν MUST NOT PUBLISH TWO DISTINCT VOTES,
〈ν, s1, t1,h(s1),h(t1)〉 AND 〈ν, s2, t2,h(s2),h(t2)〉 ,
SUCH THAT EITHER:
I. h(t1) = h(t2).
Equivalently, a validator must not publish two distinct votes for the same target height.
OR
II. h(s1) < h(s2) < h(t2) < h(t1).
Equivalently, a validator must not vote within the span of its other votes.
Figure 2: The two Casper Commandments. Any validator who violates either of these commandments gets its
deposit slashed.
c is justified, there exists a supermajority link c → c′, checkpoints c and c′ are not conflicting, and
h(c′) = h(c) + 1.
The most notable property of Casper is that it is impossible for any two conflicting checkpoints to be finalized
unless ≥ 13 of the validators violate one of the two4 Casper Commandments/slashing conditions (Figure 2).
If a validator violates either slashing condition, the evidence of the violation can be included into the blockchain
as a transaction, at which point the validator’s entire deposit is taken away with a small “finder’s fee” given to
the submitter of the evidence transaction. In current Ethereum, stopping the enforcement of a slashing condition
requires a successful 51% attack on Ethereum’s proof-of-work block proposer.
2.1. Proving Safety and Plausible Liveness
We prove Casper’s two fundamental properties: accountable safety and plausible liveness. Accountable safety
means that two conflicting checkpoints cannot both be finalized unless ≥ 13 of validators violate a slashing
condition (meaning at least one third of the total deposit is lost). Plausible liveness means that, regardless of
any previous events (e.g., slashing events, delayed blocks, censorship attacks, etc.), if ≥ 23 of validators follow
the protocol, then it’s always possible to finalize a new checkpoint without any validator violating a slashing
condition.
Under the assumption that < 13 of the validators by weight violate a slashing condition, we have the following
properties:
(i) If s1 → t1 and s2 → t2 are distinct supermajority links, then h(t1) 6= h(t2).
(ii) If s1 → t1 and s2 → t2 are distinct supermajority links, then the inequality
h(s1) < h(s2) < h(t2) < h(t1) cannot hold.
From these two properties, we can immediately see that, for any height n:
(iii) there exists at most one supermajority link s→ t with h(t) = n.
(iv) there exists at most one justified checkpoint with height n.
With these four properties in hand, we move to the main theorems.
Theorem 1 (Accountable Safety). Two conflicting checkpoints am and bn cannot both be finalized.
Proof. Let am (with justified direct child am+1, meaning h(am) + 1 = h(am+1)) and bn (with justified direct
child bn+1, meaning h(bn) + 1 = h(bn+1)) be distinct finalized checkpoints as in Figure 3. Now suppose am
and bn conflict, and without loss of generality h(am) < h(bn) (if h(am) = h(bn), then it is clear that 13 of
validators violated condition I). Let r → b1 → b2 → · · · → bn be a chain of checkpoints, such that there
4Earlier versions of Casper had two types of messages and four slashing conditions[10], but we have reduced this to one
message type and two slashing conditions. We removed the conditions: (i) Committed hashes must already be justified, and (ii)
prepare messages must point to an already justified ancestor. This is a design choice. We made this choice so that slashing
violations are independent of the state of the chain.
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exists a supermajority link r → b1, . . ., bi → bi+1, . . . , bn → bn+1. We know that no h(bi) equals either
h(am) or h(am+1), because that violates property (iv). Let j be the lowest integer such that h(bj) > h(am+1);
then h(bj−1) < h(am+1) (or h(bj−1) = h(am), which violates condition I). This implies the existence of a
supermajority link from a checkpoint with an epoch number less than h(am) to a checkpoint with an epoch
number greater than h(am+1), which is incompatible with the supermajority link from am to am+1.
Theorem 2 (Plausible Liveness). Supermajority links can always be added to produce new finalized checkpoints,
provided there exist children extending the finalized chain.5
Proof. Let a be the justified checkpoint with the greatest height, and b be the target checkpoint with the greatest
height for which any validator has made a vote. Any checkpoint a′ which is a descendant of a with height
h(a′) = h(b) + 1 can be justified without violating either commandments I or II, and then a′ can be finalized by
adding a supermajority link from a′ to a direct child of a′, also without violating either I or II.
a1 = b1
a2
b3
b2
violates II
a3
b4
r
Figure 3: Figure for Theorem 1 (Accountable Safety).
2.2. Casper’s Fork Choice Rule
Casper is more complicated than standard PoW designs. As such, the fork-choice must be adjusted. Our modified
fork-choice rule should be followed by all users, validators, and even the underlying block proposal mechanism.
If the users, validators, or block-proposers instead follow the standard PoW fork-choice rule of “always build
atop the longest chain”, there are pathological scenarios where Casper gets “stuck” and any blocks built atop
the longest chain cannot be finalized (or even justified) without some validators altruistically sacrificing their
deposit. To avoid this, we introduce a novel, correct by construction, fork choice rule: FOLLOW THE CHAIN
CONTAINING THE JUSTIFIED CHECKPOINT OF THE GREATEST HEIGHT. This fork choice rule is correct by
construction because it follows from the plausible liveness proof (Theorem 2), which precisely states that it’s
always possible to finalize a new checkpoint on top of the justified checkpoint with the greatest height. This fork
choice rule will be tweaked in Sections 3 and 4.
5The finalized chain always exists because the root is finalized by definition.
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3. Enabling Dynamic Validator Sets
The set of validators needs to be able to change. New validators must be able to join, and existing validators must
be able to leave. To accomplish this, we define the dynasty of a block. The dynasty of block b is the number of
finalized checkpoints in the chain from root to the parent of block b. When a would-be validator’s deposit message
is included in a block with dynasty d, then the validator ν will join the validator set at first block with dynasty
d+ 2. We call d+ 2 this validator’s start dynasty, DS(ν).
To leave the validator set, a validator must send a “withdraw” message. If validator ν’s withdraw message is
included in a block with dynasty d, it similarly leaves the validator set at the first block with dynasty d+2; we call
d+ 2 the validator’s end dynasty, DE(ν). If a withdraw message has not yet been included, then DE(ν) =∞.
Once validator ν leaves the validator set, the validator’s public key is forever forbidden from rejoining the validator
set. This removes the need to handle multiple start/end dynasties for a single identifier.
At the start of the end dynasty, the validator’s deposit is locked for a long period of time, called the withdrawal
delay (approximately “four months worth of blocks”), before the deposit is withdrawn. If, during the withdrawal
delay, the validator violates any commandment, the deposit is slashed.
We define two functions that generate two subsets of validators for any given dynasty d, the forward validator set
and the rear validator set. They are defined as,
Vf(d) ≡ {ν : DS(ν) ≤ d < DE(ν)}
Vr(d) ≡ {ν : DS(ν) < d ≤ DE(ν)} .
Note this means that the forward validator set of dynasty d is the rear validator set of dynasty d + 1, i.e.,
Vf(d) = Vr(d + 1). To support these dynamic validator sets, we redefine a supermajority link and a finalized
checkpoint as follows:
• An ordered pair of checkpoints (s, t), where t is in dynasty d, has a supermajority link if both at least 23
of the forward validator set of dynasty d have published votes s→ t and at least 23 of the rear validator
set of dynasty d have published votes s→ t.
• Previously, a checkpoint c was called finalized if c is justified and there is a supermajority link from
c→ c′ where c′ is a child of c. We now add the condition that c is finalized if only if the votes for the
supermajority link c→ c′, as well as the supermajority link justifying c, are included in c′’s block chain
and before the child of c′—i.e., before block number h(c′) ∗ 100 + 1.
The forward and rear validator sets will usually greatly overlap; but if the two validator sets substantially differ,
this “stitching” mechanism prevents safety failure in the case when two grandchildren of a finalized checkpoint
have different dynasties because the evidence was included in one chain but not the other. For an example of this,
see Figure 4.
4. Stopping Attacks
There are two well-known attacks against proof-of-stake systems: long range revisions and catastrophic crashes.
We discuss each in turn.
4.1. Long Range Revisions
The withdrawal delay after a validator’s end dynasty introduces a synchronicity assumption between validators
and clients. Once a coalition of validators has withdrawn their deposits, if that coalition had more than 23 of
deposits long ago in the past, they can use their historical supermajority to finalize conflicting checkpoints without
fear of getting slashed (because they have already withdrawn their money). This is called the long-range revision
attack, see in Figure 5.
In simple terms, long-range attacks are prevented by a fork choice rule to never revert a finalized block, as well as
an expectation that each client will “log on” and gain a complete up-to-date view of the chain at some regular
frequency (e.g., once per 1–2 months). A “long range revision” fork that finalizes blocks older than that will
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2b. Votes finalizing block s 
are included in these 
intermediate blocks, so 
dynasty increments.
2a Votes finalizing 
block s are not 
included in these 
intermediate blocks, 
so the dynasty 
doesn’t increment
1. At this checkpoint:
* Purple is the validator set
* But in the next dynasty,
   purple exits and green joins.
c c′
s
Figure 4: Attack from dynamic validator sets. Without the validator set stitching mechanism, it’s possible for
two conflicting checkpoints c and c′ to both be finalized without any validator getting slashed. In this case c and c′
are the same height thus violating commandment I, but because the validator sets finalizing c and c′ are disjoint,
no one gets slashed.
simply be ignored, because all clients will have already seen a finalized block at that height and will refuse to
revert it.
We make an informal proof of the mechanism as follows. Suppose that:
• There is a maximum communication delay δ between two clients, so if one client hears some message
at time t, all other clients are guaranteed to have heard it by time t + δ. This means that we can talk
about the “time window” [tmin, tmax] during which a block was received by the network, with width
tmax − tmin at most δ.
• We assume that all clients have local clocks that are perfectly synchronized (any discrepancy can be
treated as being part of the communication delay δ).
• Blocks are required to have timestamps. If a client has local time TL, then it will reject blocks whose
timestamp TB satisfies TB > TL (i.e., in the future), and they will refuse to accept as finalized (but may
still accept as part of the chain) blocks where TB < TL − δ (i.e., too far in the past)
• If a validator sees a slashing violation at time t (that’s the time they hear the later of the two votes
required for a slashing violation), then they reject blocks with timestamps > t+2δ that are part of chains
that have not yet included this slashing evidence.
Suppose that a large set of slashing violations results in two conflicting finalized checkpoints, c1 and c2. If the two
time windows do not intersect, then all validators agree which checkpoint came first and everyone follows the rule
to not revert finalized checkpoints then there is no issue.
If the two time windows do intersect, then we can handle the case as follows. Let c1’s time window be [0, δ] and
c2’s time window be [δ − , 2δ − ]. Then the timestamps of both are at least 0. By time 2δ it is guaranteed that
all clients have seen the slashing violation, so they reject blocks with timestamp > 4δ whose chains have not yet
included the evidence transaction. Hence, as long as ω > 4δ, it’s guaranteed that malfeasant validators will lose
their deposits in all chains that any client accepts, where ω is the “withdraw delay” (Figure 5), the delay between
the end-epoch and when validators actually receive their deposits back.
Due to network delays, it’s possible that clients will disagree whether a given piece of slashing evidence was
submitted into a given chain “on time” or as having accepted it too late. However, this is only a liveness failure,
not a safety failure, and this possibility does not weaken our security claims because it is already known that a
corrupted proposal mechanism (which would be required to prevent evidence inclusion) can prevent finality.
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Figure 5: The long range attack. As long as a client gains complete knowledge of the justified chain at a regular
interval, it will not be susceptible to a long range attack.
We can also sidestep the issue of evidence inclusion timeouts by informally arguing that attacks will be short-lived,
because the validators will perceive a long-running chain without including slashing evidence as an attack and
switch to another branch supported by an honest minority of validators that are not part of the attack (see Section
4.2) thus stopping the attack and slashing the attacker.
4.2. Castastrophic Crashes
Suppose that > 13 of validators crash-fail at the same time—i.e., they are no longer connected to the network due
to a network partition, computer failure, or the validators themselves are malicious. Intuitively, from this point on,
no supermajority links can be created, and thus no future checkpoints can be finalized.
We can recover from this by instituting an “inactivity leak” which slowly drains the deposit of any validator that
does not vote for checkpoints, until eventually its deposit sizes decrease low enough that the validators who are
voting are a supermajority. The simplest formula is something like “in every epoch a validator with deposit size D
fails to vote, it loses D ∗ p (for 0 < p < 1)”, though to resolve catastrophic crashes more quickly a formula which
increases the leak rate in the event of a long streak of non-finalized blocks may be optimal.
This drained ether can be burned or returned to the validator after ω days. Whether leaked assets should be burned
or returned as well as the exact formula for the inactivity leak is outside the scope of this paper as these are
questions of economic incentives, not Byzantine-fault-tolerance.
The inactivity leak introduces the possibility of two conflicting checkpoints being finalized without any validator
getting slashed (as in Figure 6), with validators only losing money on only one of the two checkpoints. Assume the
validators are split into two subsets, with subset VA voting on chain A and subset VB voting on chain B. On chain
A, VB’s deposits will leak, and vice versa, leading to each subset having a supermajority on its respective chain,
allowing two conflicting checkpoints to be finalized without any validators being explicitly slashed (but each
subset will lose a large portion of their deposit on one of the two chains due to leaks). If this situation happens,
then each validator should simply favor whatever finalized checkpoint it saw first.
The exact algorithm for recovering from these various attacks remains an open problem. For now, we assume
validators can detect obviously malfeasant behavior (e.g., not including evidence) and manually create a “minority
soft fork”. This minority fork can be viewed as a blockchain in its own right that competes with the majority chain
in the market, and if the majority chain truly is operated by colluding malicious attackers then we can assume that
the market will favor the minority fork.
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} Validator A goes offline and slowly leaks. Validator B strikes once it is a supermajority.
Justified and 
Finalized by A
Justified by A
Justified and 
Finalized by B
Justified by B 
Figure 6: Inactivity leak. The checkpoint on the left can be finalized immediately. The checkpoint on the right
can be finalized after some time, once offline validator deposits sufficiently deplete.
5. Conclusions
We presented Casper, a novel proof of stake system derived from the Byzantine fault tolerance literature. Casper
includes: two slashing conditions, a correct-by-construction fork choice rule inspired by [11], and dynamic
validator sets. Finally we introduced extensions to Casper (not reverting finalized checkpoints and the inactivity
leak) to defend against two common attacks.
Casper remains imperfect. For example, a wholly compromised block proposal mechanism will prevent Casper
from finalizing new blocks. Casper is a PoS-based strict security improvement to almost any PoW chain. The
problems that Casper does not wholly solve, particularly related to 51% attacks, can still be corrected using
user-activated soft forks. Future developments will undoubtedly improve Casper’s security and reduce the need
for user-activated soft forks.
Future Work. The current Casper system builds upon a proof of work block proposal mechanism. We wish
to convert the block proposal mechanism to proof of stake. We wish to prove accountable safety and plausible
liveness even when the weights of the validator set change with rewards and penalties. Another problem for future
work is a formal specification of a fork-choice rule taking into account the common attacks on proof of stake.
Future workpapers will explain and analyze the financial incentives within Casper and their consequences. A
particular economic problem related to such automated strategies to block attackers is proving upper bounds on
the ratio between the degree of disagreement between different clients and the cost incurred by the attacker.
Acknowledgements. We thank Jon Choi, Karl Floersch, Ozymandias Haynes, and Vlad Zamfir for frequent
discussions.
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